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SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK,
APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT
People v. Kelly'
(decided August 19, 2004)
Thomas Kelly was convicted of murder in the second
degree and sentenced to an indeterminate term of 22 years to life
imprisonment. 2

Post-sentencing, Kelly moved to vacate the

conviction based on a court officer's unauthorized demonstration
to a deliberating jury, "undertaken at the jury's request, of pulling
a bayonet, the murder weapon, from its sheath." 3 The motion was
denied after an evidentiary hearing where the court found that the
defendant had waived any issue concerning the demonstration; he
did not request a mistrial, but agreed to a curative instruction.4
Kelly appealed both the judgment of conviction and the denial of
his motion,5 claiming a violation of the United States Constitution6
and the New York State Constitution,7 as well as New York's
Criminal Procedure Law.'

' 781 N.Y.S.2d 75 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
2Id. at 88.
3
1d.
4

at 78.
1d. at 87.
5
1d. at 78.
6 U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in pertinent part:
"In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury... ; to be confronted with the witnesses against him. .."
7 N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6 provides in pertinent part: "In any trial in any court
whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and
...be confronted with the witnesses against him or her."
8 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 310.30 (McKinney 2004) provides in pertinent
part:
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He argued that the trial court committed two fundamental
errors, so serious as to present an issue of law even without
preservation.9 First, the court officer's interaction with the jury
"constituted a usurpation of a judicial function or delegation
thereof, an error so serious that it cannot be waived without a
waiver, in writing, signed personally by him,"' depriving him of
the right to trial by jury, "an integral component of which is the
supervision of a judge."" Then, through his demonstration to the
jury, the court officer became an unsworn trial witness, thus
violating Kelly's right to be present during a material stage of the
trial. "

The trial court held these arguments to be without merit.
The court officer's jury room demonstration fell within his
ministerial duties and did not constitute an abrogation of judicial
authority."

By settling upon an instruction to disregard the jury

room demonstration, "it was the court and the parties who had the
final say on the matter."' 4
Any claim that the jury room demonstration
At any time during its deliberation, the jury may request the
court for further instruction or information... with respect to
any other matter pertinent to the jury's consideration of the
case. Upon such a request, the court must direct that the jury
be returned to the courtroom and, after notice to both the
people and counsel for the defendant, and in the presence of
the defendant, must give such requested information or
instruction as the court deems proper.
9 Kelly, 781 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
'0 Id.
at 83.
"Id.
at 84.
2
1 1d at 83.
3 Id.
at 85.
14

Kelly, 781 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
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violated defendant's right to be present at a material
stage of the trial was waived by his consent to the
court's curative instruction

. .

. But, beyond that, a

defendant does not have a right to be present at jury
deliberations. Nor does the injection of extra-record
material into jury deliberations convert those
deliberations into a trial stage at which defendant
must be present. 5
Any resulting error should have been preserved for appeal,
providing relief only if the defendant suffered harm. 6
Since 1993, defendant had lived with Dawn Kaye, a drug
user. In July of 1997, she ended their relationship, moved in with
her father William Hageman, and worked as a prostitute to support
her narcotics habit.

Thomas Kelly attempted several times to

reconcile with her, but was rejected. 7 On the evening of July 29,
1997, Kelly approached Kaye and her father outside a building in
Manhattan's East Village. 8

After Kaye made it clear that she

wanted no further involvement with Kelly, he attempted to
denounce her to her father. 9 That failing to be effective, Kelly
made a sudden move toward Hageman who fell to the ground
2
while Kelly held onto a bayonet emerging from Hageman's chest.

°

This was the very same bayonet that Kelly had purchased, at
Kaye's suggestion, to make her feel safe when she was alone in his
apartment. 2' Kelly announced that he had killed Kaye's father and

" Id. at 88.

161id

17 1d. at 78.
18 Id.

'9Kelly, 781 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
20
21

Id,
Id. at 80.
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Several witnesses confirmed the argument and assault.23

fled.2"

Responding to a radio call of the stabbing, a police officer
identified Kelly as matching the description of the perpetrator and
arrested him, whereupon Kelly confessed to the stabbing.24
Hageman died on the way to the hospital 25 and Kelly was charged
with second-degree murder.
At trial, the parties agreed to allow trial exhibits into the
jury room whenever the jurors requested them.26 In response to a
written request, a court officer brought the murder weapon, the
bayonet and sheath, into the jury room during deliberations.27 The
court officer refused to allow the jurors to handle the exhibits, but
agreed to remove the bayonet from its sheath and responded to
jurors' questions regarding the demonstration.28

Immediately

thereafter, the officer reported the episode to the judge, who then
notified counsel; both parties agreed with the court upon a curative
instruction to disregard the demonstration; the jury was returned to
the courtroom and instructed to disregard any demonstrations with
evidence provided by court officers in the jury room.29

Upon

further deliberation, the jury returned a guilty verdict.3"
Kelly was sentenced and moved to vacate the judgment

Id.at 78.
Id. at 79.
24 Kelly, 781 N.Y.S.2d at 79.

22
23

25 Id.
261d.at
27 id.

81.

28

id.

29

Kelly, 781 N.Y.S.2d at 81.

30 Id.
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based on the jury room demonstration." His motion was supported
by the affidavits of two jurors who stated that the jury attempted to
reenact the incident, wanting to test the plausibility of defendant's
statements concerning the removal of the bayonet.32 To do so, they
requested that the bayonet and sheath be brought into the jury
room, that the court officer place it into his waistband and pull the
bayonet out by the handle.3" Further, they asked several questions
concerning the procedure and asked to handle the exhibits. 4 Both
jurors indicated that the officer complied with all requests, stated
that the bayonet came out of the sheath easily, and that the jurors
did not handle the weapon. 5
Kelly's trial attorney also supported the motion with an
affirmation of the incident.36 He further indicated that he discussed
the event with the defendant and agreed to a curative instruction
rather than requesting a mistrial.37 In addition, Kelly submitted
letters from one of the jurors stating his belief, based on
subsequently acquired information, that the defendant had been
convicted of the wrong charge.38 He said the demonstration lent
credence to Kelly's testimony but the majority had dismissed it as
inconclusive.39

An independent supervising

court officer's

affidavit described the jury-shepherding responsibilities of court
31 id.
32 id.
33 Id.
34

Kelly, 781 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
Id. at 81-82.
36 Id. at
82.
35

37 id

38 id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013

5

CONFRONTATION
Touro
Law Review, Vol. 21, CLA
No. 1 USE
[2013], Art. 3

2005]

officers: informing jurors that requests to the court must be in
writing and that the jury not be alone with or handle any weapons
exhibits.40

One of their most important duties is to safeguard

jurbrs.4 ' After an evidentiary hearing, the motion was denied.

2

On appeal, the defendant argued for a new trial, contending
th tthe court'officer usurped or was delegated judicial authority by
his refusal to allow the jurors to handle the weapon and failure to
advise them that their request had to be in writing.4 3 Additionally,
the 'jury room demonstration and conversation violated the
defendant's right to be present at a material stage of the trial." The
defendant claimed that these violations were error as a matter of
law.
*

Delegation

of judicial

responsibility

to

non-judicial

personnel deprives a defendant of his right to trial by jury, of
i~hich judicial supervision is an integral part. 5 Judicial failure to
retain control of jury deliberations "implicates the organization of
'
the court and the prescribed mode of proceedings."46

A

defendant's right to be present at all material stages of a trial is a
constitutional and statutory right.47 Violation of any of these rights
prese-rits an issue of law subject to appellate review, regardless of

3 Kelly, 781 N.Y.S.2d at 82.
40 Id at 83.
41Id.at
42

85.

Id at 83.

43 id.

44

45
46

Kelly, 781 N.Y.S.2d at 83.

Id. at 83-84.

Id. at 84.

47 id.
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whether the infringement was preserved by objection.48
Nevertheless, the court found the defendant's arguments to
be without merit.49

"A delegation of judicial authority is a

conscious abdication of judicial responsibility."5

The judge was

unaware of the jurors' requests to handle the weapon exhibit and
thus could not instruct the court officer, who in this case was
simply performing his job by a ministerial act."

There were

neither legal instructions nor information conveyed to the jury
through his refusal to allow juror handling of the bayonet and
sheath.

2

"Rather, in refusing the request, the officer was merely

fulfilling his ministerial duty of safeguarding the jury.

'3

The court

officer's lapse in assuring that the jury's request was in writing
was a ministerial failure, not "an error affecting the mode of the
proceedings so as to exempt it from ordinary preservation and
waiver rules."' 4

The officer's

subsequent

and immediate

notification to the court of the incident was equivalent to asking
the jury to put its request in writing.5

All parties and the court

were put on notice by the disclosure56 and agreed on a limiting
instruction to the jury to disregard the encounter. 7 The court and

48 id.
49

Kelly, 781 N.Y.S.2d at 84.

50 Id.
51 Id.at 84-85.
52 Id. at 85.
53Id.
54 Kelly, 781 N.Y.S.2d
55 id.

at 85.

56 id.

57

Id.at 86.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013

7

Touro
Law Review, TION
Vol. 21,CLA
No. 1USE
[2013], Art. 3
CONFRONTA

2005]

the parties had the final word. 8
Insofar as defendant's right to be present at a material stage
of the trial was concerned, the court found that the incident
complained of occurred during jury deliberations at which
defendants do not have a right to be present. 9 Finally, the officer's
response to jury questions regarding the bayonet and sheath
provided extra-record information to which the defendant did not
protest.

Instead, he consented to a remedy - the limiting

instruction. Protests must be submitted in a timely fashion along
with a requested remedy.6" To justify a new trial, there must be a
resulting likelihood of prejudice.6 The jury did not learn anything
different than they would have if they performed the experiment
themselves and the demonstration did not harm the defendant. 2 It
"was not a factor in the jury's verdict."63 Defense counsel never
argued for a new trial, but agreed to the curative instruction, and
thus waived this right. 4

The court held the defendant had

consented to a waiver of the demonstration and was now
presenting a meritless argument for an alternative remedy - a new
trial. 5 The trial court's conviction and sentence was affirmed.6 6

58 Id.
59
60 Kelly,

781 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
Id.at 87.

61 id
62 id.
63

Id.at 88.
64 Kelly, 781 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
65 id.
66

Id.at 88.
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In Capital Traction Co. v. Hof,7 the United States Supreme

Court defined trial by jury pursuant to common law and the
Constitution as
a trial by jury of twelve men, in the presence and
under the superintendence of a judge empowered to
instruct them on the law and to advise them on the
facts, and (except on acquittal of a criminal charge)
to set aside the verdict if in his opinion it is against
the law or the evidence.68
Justice Cardozo discussed a defendant's right to be present
at all stages of a trial as a due process and confrontation right in
Snyder v. Massachusetts,69 where the defendant was not present at
a jury view of the crime scene. The Court said exclusion from trial
proceedings must be determined in the totality of circumstances.7"
A view is not part of a trial7" and due process considerations do not
infer "in so many words that [the defendant] must be present every
second or minute or even every hour of the trial."72 However, the
defendant has a privilege "to be present in his own person
whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the
fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge."73 If no
61 174 U.S. 1 (1899) (holding the right to a trial by jury in a civil case was

available to a passenger who sued a railroad for negligence where damages
exceeded
twenty dollars).
68
1d. at 13-14.
69 291 U.S. 97, 102 (1934) (holding that defendant's absence during a jury
view, attended by the court and counsel for both parties, did not deprive
defendant of his constitutional right to be present during all material stages of a
trial).
7
°ld at 115.
7
72 Id at 113.
1d. at 116.
73
1d. at 105-06.
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harm is suffered and no substantive right is implicated, the
exclusion constitutes harmless error.74

The same is true of

misconduct by the jury.75 By extension, this would apply to nonjudicial court personnel.
A court officer's statements to individual jury members
professing his thoughts as to the defendant's guilt led the Supreme
Court, in Parker v. Gladden, to reverse a second-degree murder
conviction and remand for a new trial.76

"[T]he unauthorized

communication was prejudicial"77 and violated the defendant's
Sixth amendment right to a trial by an impartial jury and right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses, fundamental components of
a fair trial.78
The Second Circuit, in Freeman v. United States, indicated,
"it is the duty of a trial judge to be present during all the stages of a
criminal trial. His absence during the examination of a witness,
during the argument of counsel, or at the handing in of a verdict,
has been held to constitute reversible error."79 Thus, the presence
of a judge, the same judge throughout the trial, is required to assure
a fair trial.

Nonetheless, the Second Circuit found that a trial

where an absent judge provided instructions via telephone
regarding a jury request for display of exhibits during deliberations
74 Snyder, 291
75 Id.

U.S. at 118.

76 385 U.S. 363, 363, 366 (1966).
77

Id. at 364.
Id at 365.
79 227 F. 732, 759 (2d Cir. 1915) (holding that substitution of judges during
the course of a trial constituted reversible error and reversing defendant's
conviction of criminal charges).
78
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was valid as consented to by counsel for both parties."0 The error
was harmless and consent was sufficient since no substantial rights
were involved."'
Looking at the ministerial duties of a court officer, the New
York Court of Appeals found, in People v. Bonaparte, that "the
supervisory role of the court officer with respect to a deliberating
jury will often require the officer to speak to the jurors about a
variety of ...

matters.

' -

This might include "determining who to

contact to secure whatever personal belongings the jurors might
need for an overnight stay or enforcing the court's instructions not
to discuss the case among themselves or others during periods of
sequestration.' 8 3 In this case, the court officer's communication
with the jury fell within the scope of his administerial duties; at the
court's direction, he told the jurors to stop deliberating for the
evening.84

These actions in no way implicated the defendant's

constitutional right to trial by jury even though the instructions to
cease deliberation were not delivered by a judge. No improper
delegation of judicial authority occurred because the officer did not
instruct the jury as to the manner or subject of deliberation; neither
the judge's nor the defendant's presence was required.85
State law requires the personal presence of the accused
80

Rice v. United States, 35 F.2d 689, 696 (2d Cir. 1929) (holding that physical

absence of the judge, who provided telephone instructions in response to a jury
request during deliberations, was not reversible error).
81 id .
82

574 N.E.2d 1027, 1029 (N.Y. 1991).

83 Id.
4
1
85

Id. at 1030.
Id
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whenever information or instruction is provided to a deliberating
jury. 6 The Court of Appeals held the defendant's statutory and
constitutional right to be present at a material stage of his trial was
not abrogated when only the judge and counsel for the parties
briefly met with the jury to clarify a request.87

A criminal

defendant has an absolute right to be present with counsel
"whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to
the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.""8 This
includes the right to be present during the court's instructions to
the jury where the applicable principles of law are communicated,
and instructions responding to the jury's requests.8 9

Here, the

communication was simply a clarification of a readback request;9"
the court did not provide any information or instructions to the
jury. 9

The defendant's presence was unnecessary, and thus not

constitutionally required.92
In People v. Ahmed, the judge's absence and delegation of
judicial authority to his law secretary left two jury requests
unanswered when the jury delivered its guilty verdict.93

Even

though he consented to the delegation, the defendant was deprived
of his right to a trial by jury.94 Supervision by the presiding judge
is a vital part of the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury, which
16
87

88

N.Y.CRIM. PROC. LAW § 310.30 (McKinney 2004).
People v. Harris, 559 N.E.2d 660, 661 (N.Y. 1990).
Id. (quoting Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105-106).

'9Id. at 661-62.

90Id. at 662.
91 Id
92

Harris,559 N.E.2d at 662.

9'487 N.E.2d 894 (N.Y. 1985).
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol21/iss1/3
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It is the judge's duty to be present and

maintain control throughout the trial.96

Delegation of judicial

authority for nonministerial matters is a constitutional violation.
Where a court officer exceeds his ministerial duties, he
usurps judicial authority and the defendant is deprived of his
constitutional right to a jury trial.97 In People v. Khalek, after the
court ordered the jury to cease deliberations for the evening,
several jurors told a court officer that they had reached a verdict.98
Instead of informing the judge, he told them they would not be
permitted to deliver the verdict until the following morning.99
Outside the scope of the officer's duties, his remarks were not a
repetition of the court's directive,"0° but rather an appropriation of
authority, presenting an error of law.'
A defendant's opportunity to defend against a criminal
charge in People v. Ciaccio was extinguished when a court clerk
made

an unauthorized

statement to

a

deadlocked jury.102

Representing that he was speaking for the court, the clerk
impressed upon the jury the need to keep deliberating." 3 Neither
defendant nor his counsel was aware that this took place" ° and,
94

Id. at 894.

95 Id.
96

Id. at 896-97 (citing Freeman, 227 F. at 743-44 and distinguishing Rice, 35

F.2d 689).
97 People v. Khalek, 689 N.E.2d 914, 915 (N.Y. 1997).
98
1d. at 914-15.
99Id. at 915.
1°° Id
101 Id.
102

391 N.E.2d 1347, 1349 (N.Y. 1979).

103 Id.
104 id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013

13

Touro
Law Review,TION
Vol. 21,CLA
No. 1USE
[2013], Art. 3
CONFRONTA

20051

further, the jury had no idea that the judge was unaware of the
communication." 5 Defining the defendant's right of presence, the
court said that it includes "all proceedings ... impaneling the jury,

receiving evidence, the summations of counsel, receiving the
verdict and . . . all proceedings dealing with the court's charge,

admonishments, and instructions to the jury," where the court is
required to state the law." 6

If supplemental instructions are

necessary, "the presence of the defendant and his counsel is
constitutionally required."'0 7
Reversible error was again found in People v. Mehmedi
when a deliberating jury requested information and the court
reconvened, with neither the defendant nor the jury returned to the
courtroom, to write a response.'

State law requires that "the court

must return the jury to the courtroom . . . after proper notice to

counsel 'and in the presence of the defendant,' give such requested
information or instructions as the court deems proper."'0 9 Absent
such action, a defendant suffers violation of his constitutional
rights, an error so fundamental that it presents a question of law
absent objection." 0
While the defendant and counsel were absent, in People v.
Van, the court responded to a jury request for a document not

105 Id.
10 6 Id. at 1349-50.

Ciaccio, 391 N.E.2d at 1350.
'0' 505 N.E.2d 610, 610 (N.Y. 1987).
107

'09 Id. at 610-11. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 310.30 (McKinney 2004).

"01 Id. at 611.
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol21/iss1/3
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admitted as evidence and later advised the parties of the request."'
All agreed to inform the jury that the relevant testimony could be
reread, and it was."2 Defendant did not object at the time, but
claimed, on appeal, that he was absent at a material stage of the
trial." 3 The court held that review was waived."'

"[T]he jury's

request, coupled with the court's response, raised no issues
affecting

any

'substantial

right'

of

defendant,

and

the

communication between court and jury outside of defendant's
presence was not such 'a material part of the trial' requiring
reversal.'"

15

Courts have grappled with the inextricably intertwined
issues of the judge's absence and the defendant's absence in
determining whether a defendant has been denied his federal and
state constitutional right to a trial by jury. In each instance, the
courts have analyzed the circumstances in their totality. Where a
judge is absent and a court officer interacts with a deliberating
jury, courts have had to determine the extent of the encounter and
whether it falls within the scope of the officer's ministerial duties
or whether the matter is material to the issues at trial. Where the
defendant is absent, the courts have had to analyze the situation to
determine whether any substantive rights were at stake and
whether the defendant was harmed. By delineating these matters,
the courts have determined where the dividing lines exist between
...565 N.Y.S.2d 91, 91 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 id.
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a denial of rights and a harmless error.

In Kelly, the court

concluded that the performance of an essentially ministerial
function did not warrant the presence of the judge and/or the
defendant, if the defendant was not prejudiced by the absence.
This reasoning is in line with interpretation of both federal and
state constitutional provisions in the courts of New York State and
the federal courts.
In conclusion, both the United States and New York State
Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the right to a proper
trial by jury where all participants - judge, jury, counsel, and
defendant - are present for all matters materially and substantially
related to the charge.

New York Criminal Procedure Law has

refined this guarantee and delineated the conduct necessary to
provide a proper jury trial and the courts have been left to
determine the extent to which these rules are flexible. New York
and federal courts have construed minor infractions, not infringing
upon any substantial right of the defendant, as waivable. "There is
danger that the criminal law will be brought into contempt ...

if

gossamer possibilities of prejudice to a defendant are to nullify a
sentence pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction in
obedience to local law, and set the guilty free."'1 6 Kelly conforms
to this view.
HannahAbrams

116

Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934).
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